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When respecting patients’ wishes
puts them in harm’s way

A

n ethical dilemma involves having
to make a choice between alternatives that require compromising
one or more ethical principles. Consider
the situation of a debilitated yet competent
adult patient who insists on returning to a
home environment that health care professionals (HCPs) think is unsafe. Imagine
that the patient cannot take care of her basic
needs (for example, cooking, bathing, answering the door, housecleaning), and that
she has run out of money to pay for the help
she would need to maintain a safe home environment for herself. She might qualify for
Medicaid to pay for a nursing home stay,
but not for the home care needed to keep
her well cared for in her home. The patient
is adamant that she would rather die in her
own home than go anywhere else—particularly a nursing home.
In such a situation, two fundamental
ethical obligations appear to be in direct
conflict: (1) the duty to promote the
patient’s well-being and protect the patient
from harm and (2) the duty to respect the
wishes of a competent patient. HCPs who
become involved in caring for such a patient
would be justifiably concerned that the
patient’s well-being is threatened and that
the potential for harm is great if she returns
to her home under these circumstances.
At the same time, HCPs may be troubled
by the prospect of overriding the patient’s
wishes.
The AMA Principles of Medical Ethics
state that “[a] physician shall respect the
rights of patients.” Among other rights,

patients are acknowledged to have the right
of self-determination. Of course, this hasn’t
always been the case in American medicine.
As recently as the 1950’s and early 1960’s,
HCP’s were often quite paternalistic
towards patients. In the context of complex
shifts in social norms in the 1960s and
1970s, patient autonomy became established
as a dominant principle in bioethics. As a
result, the patient’s status in the patient-HCP
relationship has evolved to include patient
involvement in medical decision making.
But, does the right of patients to decide for
themselves extend to the right to make a bad
decision?
Patients have the right to define for
themselves the values and goals that will
determine their medical care. These values
and goals inform decision making about
specific medical interventions; e.g., deciding
between alternative treatment approaches.
To facilitate this right of patients to be
self-determined, physicians should adopt
a patient-centered approach, taking care to
determine the patient’s values and goals
of care, as well as eliciting the patient’s
perspective on their illness. It is often
difficult for physicians and other members
of the health care team to accept patients’
decisions that depart from a professional’s
recommended course of action, which is
intended, of course, to benefit the patient.
Even though such decisions may preclude
benefit in a biomedical sense, decisions
that are congruent with patients’ values
and goals may benefit patients in other
ways. Patient choices that endanger their
Cont. on page 2
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When Respecting Patient's Wishes Puts
Them In Harm's Way
Cont. from page 1

well-being and appear to conflict with
their own stated values and goals are
especially difficult to accept because
they appear to be not only “bad”
from the medical perspective but also
irrational. It is important for physicians
to identify the underlying cause for
irrational decision making and approach
it appropriately (Brock & Wartman,
1990).
Many authors have expressed concern that one consequence of overly
strict adherence to the principle of
patient autonomy is that other important
principles (such as the duties to benefit
and protect patients) receive insufficient
priority. This imbalance might result in
an inappropriately limited role for patients’ physicians in important medical
decisions. The goal, it is argued, should
be to strike a proper balance between
autonomy and beneficence that would
include a healthy respect for patient selfdetermination without abandonment of
the duty to benefit patients (Pellegrino &
Thomasma, 1988). This approach would
allow physicians a meaningful role in
the patient-physician relationship and in
medical decision making, one that includes looking out for the well-being of
their patients while avoiding backsliding
toward paternalism. In general, however,
patient decisions are honored. This is
true even if patient decisions are perceived by their physicians to be “bad”
or “irrational,” unless there is a threat
of harm to a third party, an inadequately
treated psychiatric illness, or a concern
about capacity. Although concerns about
patient capacity should not be limited
to occasions when physicians consider
patient choices to be “bad” or “irrational,” it certainly makes sense that such
choices would raise these concerns.
Methods of assessing decisional capacity typically identify several essential
functional abilities and, in this way,
differ from measures of mental status,
such as the Mini-Mental State Examination. These abilities include making and
communicating a choice; understanding
relevant information about the medical
situation; appreciating that the relevant

information applies to oneself in the
situation at hand and, perhaps, in the
future; and engaging in rational deliberation about treatment options and being able to describe why one particular
choice was made, rather than another,
based on one’s own values (Grisso &
Applebaum, 1998). A bedside tool to
evaluate capacity for treatment decisions
is available and it has been empirically studied, yet time considerations
may limit its widespread application in
clinical practice (Grisso,Applebaum, &
Hill-Fotouhi, 1997).
Some authors have argued for a flexible standard with respect to decisional
capacity: the idea that as the risk of
harm increases, the criteria for capacity
should accordingly become more stringent (Buchanan & Brock, 1989). For
example, it may not be sufficient that
the patient has consistently expressed
a strong desire to remain in her home.
The patient should also demonstrate
that she appreciates the potential harms
she may encounter if she remains in her
home. Also, while a patient’s consistently stated preferences should be given
proper consideration, the HCP should
keep in mind that patient preferences
may appropriately change over time or
as circumstances change, and reassess
accordingly.
There are many possible responses to
a patient who refuses treatment recommendations. In particularly frustrating
cases, some HCP’s are tempted to disengage and accept patients’ decisions out
of resignation or even anger. Although
this approach may seem easier for the
physician, it may not serve patients’ best
interests. Alternatively, physicians may
reject a patient’s refusal and attempt
to impose treatment (e.g., transfer to a
rehab facility) through whatever means
available, including pursuit of legal
options through the courts. In many
states, in the absence of a mental illness
associated with dangerousness to self
or others, attempts to force placement
or treatment against a patient’s will
can only be pursued if the patient is
deemed by a judge to be incompetent.
Another response to treatment refusal is
to explain the physician’s perspective to

the patient, attempting to persuade the
patient to change his or her mind while
avoiding manipulation or coercion.
When a patient refuses the recommended plan of care, physicians should
regard such resistance as an opportunity to initiate (or continue) dialogue
in an effort to understand the patient’s
perspective. What factors are contributing to the patient’s point of view and
influencing her decision making? Have
members of the health care team considered and explored religious beliefs, cultural background, various psychosocial
factors, previous interactions with the
health care system, influential personal
experiences, or the preferences of family members or friends? The physician
should determine the consistency of the
patient’s choice vis-à-vis the patient’s
values and goals. Is the proposed choice
compatible with the achievement of
those expressed goals? Is it the best
choice to achieve those goals? For
example, would the patient consider
short-term treatment in a rehab facility
to maximize her health and functional
ability in order to achieve her ultimate
goal of remaining in her home long-

term? Have all options been explored to
provide home care assistance? Careful
consideration of these issues could lead
to better ways of communicating with
the patient and, ideally, to better decisions and outcomes.
Joseph A, Carrese, M.D., M.P.H.
Associate Professor of Medicine
Division of General Internal
Medicine, Johns Hopkins Bayview
Medical Center
Director and Blaustein Scholar,
Program on Ethics in Clinical Practice,
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of
Bioethics Johns Hopkins University
This article was adapted with permission
from the Journal of the American Medical
Association from the article (published in the
8/9/06 issue): Patients’ well-being and physicians’ ethical obligations. “But doctor, I want
to go home” JAMA. 2006;296:691-695. Copyright © (2006), American Medical Association.
All rights reserved.
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Regional News
The Maryland Health Care Ethics
Committee Network co-sponsored
a series of "journal club meetings"
in October to show and discuss the
documentary, “Health, Money &
Fear.” The 50 minute documentary
summarizes what is wrong with our
health care system, and what we need to
do to fix it.
On December 3, 2008, MHECN cosponsored the conference, “Health Care
Ethics Committees and Maryland Law
– Time for a Change?” at Broadmead in
Cockeysville, MD. See p. 11 (Box) for
more information about this conference.
In the summer of 2009, MHECN will
present its bienniel basic ethics educa-

tion conference for ethics committee
members. Information about this conference will be available in the Spring of
2009. Contact info: MHECN@law.
umaryland.edu, (410) 706-4457..
The Montgomery County Coalition
for End of Life Care has recently
created a simplified advance directive
form that focuses on appointing a health
care agent and identifying preferences
for end of life care to inform the health
care agent. The Coalition hopes that this
form will be simpler to understand than
the current Maryland living will form,
and that it will support more effective
end-of-life decision-making than a traditional living will. To request a copy of
the form, e-mail Dr. Barbara Blaylock at
b.blaylock@verizon.net.

The State Advisory Council on
Quality Care at the End-of-Life met
on October 10, 2008. The Council
discussed a memorandum generated to
compare Maryland’s Life-Sustaining
Treatment Options (“LST”) form
(formerly the “Patient’s Plan of Care
Form”) to the Physician Orders for
Life-Sustaining Treatment (“POLST”)
form. The POLST is a physician’s
order while the LST form is a document
expressing the patient’s current
treatment preferences with the hope
that physicians' orders will be generated
that are consistent with those treatment
preferences. For more information about
the Council’s meetings and activities,
visit http://www.oag.state.md.us/
healthpol/SAC/index.htm.
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Health care reform:
Unintended consequences of regulation
The last issue of the MAEC
Newsletter featured a summary
of talks given at a conference
that MHECN sponsored on April
7, 2008, entitled “The Ethics of
Health Care Reform.” A central
theme that ran through many of
the talks was that of improving
the “cost-effectiveness” of
our health care system. Here,
Rebecca Elon provides a note
of caution regarding unintended
consequences of health care
reform efforts intended to control
costs.
“It is your duty to devote yourselves
to your patients and your practice. If
you are diligent in your work, society
will reward you amply. You should be
interested in medicine, not money. If it
is money that interests you, go work on
Wall Street.”

W

ith that rebuke, my 80 yearold elder colleague left the
room. I was left behind with
15 second-year medical students who
had been discussing the various salaries
they could expect to earn in different
medical specialities after graduation.
My colleague had been a private attending physician at the academic teaching hospital since the mid 1950’s. He
practiced during an era when medicine
was a sovereign profession with more
moral authority than economic power.
Today, however, the opposite seems
true. Medical students cannot understand
the vast health care industry they are
entering without reading the Wall Street
Journal in addition to the New England
Journal. Many medical students are
leaving their training with $150,000 or
more in educational debts, and finding
that primary care fields and jobs with
underserved populations may not allow
them to service their academic debts
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and live the lifestyle they believe they
should be entitled to enjoy. Instead of
entering fields in which they are interested or which they believe to be good
for society, many graduates are entering fields that will minimize their hours
worked per week and maximize their
earning potential.
In the absence of a healthy social covenant, can we blame them? We as physicians have become a constantly hurried
and harried group of “piece workers.”
Since we are paid by the visit or the
procedure, as the payment per “piece”
falls, the only way to maintain income in
the face of rising costs is to increase the
volume of services provided. Patients
have become our means of production.
Since each “piece” of work has become
devalued, physicians must perform
higher volumes to meet their budgets.
For example, if a primary care physician
does not make 24 to 30 billable visits
per day, he may not be able to meet his
overhead expenses. The non-reimbursed
aspects of care, such as case management and communication, fall by the
wayside. Since medicine has become
commodified, there is less emphasis on
doctor patient relationships, and more
emphasis on the elements within the

interaction that serve to justify the reimbursement. Both physicians and patients
are feeling discontent within the current status quo. Both groups blame “the
system.” How did we get here? Why is
our health care system too expensive,
uncoordinated, lacking in prevention,
with inadequate continuity of care and
care coordination? Why are those who
deliver care, those who receive care, and
those who pay for care all dissatisfied?
If we look back historically, we find that
it is past reform efforts that have led us
to where we are today. Consider the examples listed below (see Box) of some
unintended consequences of laws or
regulations affecting health care delivery
in the U.S..
Current efforts at health care reform
often punish good people working within bad systems. American physicians
and health care workers today often feel
under siege and victimized by reform
efforts foisted upon them. The dominant
“-ism” of modern secular American
life may in fact be “regulatarianism,”
in that we seem to believe that most of
the ills of our society can be corrected
or reformed through the promulgation
of more and more governmental regulations. Regulations are now expected

Law/regulation
Unintended Consequence
Social Security Encouraged the expansion of the private pay, for-profit LTC
Act
industry.
(1935)
Hill Burton Act
(1946)

Encouraged expansion of institutional capacity in the care for
frail elders and disabled persons.

Medicaid
legislation
(1965)

Shifted financial responsibility from family to state for care of
elders; became a form of universal institutional LTC insurance.

Medicare
legislation
(1965)

Medical inflation 1970’s to present followed by cost control
efforts 1980’s to present (e.g., DRG/PPS, physician fee setting);
earlier hospital discharge; growth of sub-acute care nursing
home beds created cost shifting to LTC; physicians limiting or
opting out of Medicare.

DRG – diagnostic related groupings (a form of prospective payment)
PPS – payment for performance
LTC – long-term care

to tell us how to do the right thing the
right way. In former times, it was our
religious upbringing and/or educational
training that taught us how to do the
right thing the right way. As physicians,
our professionalism guided our actions
and formed the governance structures
in medicine. In American health care
reform, however, the dominant 20th and
21st century ethos of professionalism is
increasingly yielding to federal regulatarianism.
A couple of years ago I received a
notice from Medicare that I had tripped
the “99214 wire.” The warning letter
claimed that I was an outlier relative to
my peers, billing too high a percentage
of my outpatient visits at the higher level
code. The letter warned that I should
be absolutely sure that my documentation justified such billing since tripping
the wire placed me at risk of audit. Of
course, I was an outlier relative to my
internal medicine peers! I am a geriatrician. I cared for more people over the
age of 90 than below the age of 60. We
scheduled 30 minute follow up visits for
this population.
Although I felt we were in compliance with our billing practices, this letter
caused me to experience significant
anxiety every time I sat down to write a
chart note. We were still using 19th century paper charts. I wanted to document
more than usual, which took me more
time. Still, I could not be sure that I had
documented all the requirements each
time to bill at what was the appropriate
level based upon the time involved. I
felt compelled to under code the visit,
and bring myself into alignment with
my internal medicine peer group, for
fear of having an audit conducted on my
work. I knew people who had undergone
audits, and it was an absolutely awful
process, even if in the end they were
vindicated. My down coding resulted in
increasing financial pressure on me from
the hospital that owned our practice. The
budget had become an unsolvable problem for me in a fee for service Medicare
environment. I could not provide high
quality care and meet budget.
I quit the practice at the age of 53, to
try to find a different way of providing

quality care for frail elders in community settings.* I convened a symposium
for all the hospital sponsored geriatric
medicine programs in the Baltimore
Washington area about how to drop out
of Medicare. I was making plans to do so

invest the time required to learn all of
the differing requirements and do not
have the infrastructure to collect and
report the information being requested.
Medicare was surprised that in the first
year only 16% of physicians partici-

The current call for accountability in medicine cannot be
met by payment schemes such as pay for performance. Pay for
performance schemes are reductionistic, and do not capture
overall quality of care.
myself. Medicare, it seemed to me, had
become one of the biggest obstacles for
providing quality care to frail elders.
The current call for accountability
in medicine cannot be met by payment
schemes such as pay for performance.
Pay for performance schemes are
reductionist, and do not capture overall quality of care. For example, if an
insurance company plans to pay more
to a physician whose diabetic patients
have Hemoglobin A 1 C (blood sugar)
measurements below 7% rather than to
the physician whose diabetic patients
have an average Hemoglobin A 1 C of
8%, the insurance company may be inadvertently rewarding a physician whose
patients are less challenging and more
adherent to their medical plans of care.
The physician may have “cherry picked”
his patients, and turned away the more
challenging patients who would threaten
his ability to meet the benchmark. The
physician with the worse performance
measure may have worked skillfully and
much harder with more difficult patients
to have achieved the poorer number. The
8% may reflect an improvement for the
difficult patients from 9% or 10% and
actually represent a remarkable achievement. But if the benchmark is 7%, the
physician will not be rewarded for his
diligence and good work.
Med Chi, the Maryland Medical Society, recently held a series of symposia to
teach primary care physicians in the state
what is expected of them from pay for
performance criteria from various insurers and national organizations measuring
quality of care. The presentations were
overwhelming to the attendees (myself
included). Most small practices cannot

pated in the voluntary Product Quality
Research Institute (PQRI) measures that
could result in up to a 1.5% increase in
payment. Most small practices do not
have the capacity to capture and report
the requested information.
The momentum in medicine is toward
increasing industrialization and consolidation. Small practices will need to find
ways to work collectively and collaboratively in the data collection functions.
Whether the concept of ‘accountable
care systems’ will be able to connect
small practices and provide the needed
infrastructure is uncertain. Small practices may be destroyed over time and
be replaced by larger corporate owned
practices that have the infrastructure to
do the reporting that is currently being
requested on a voluntary basis, but may
well be mandatory in the near future.
As Derek Bok said in his book, The
Trouble with Government, “Even the
most perfectly crafted compensation
scheme cannot ensure a perfect balance
between cost and quality of care. Medical care requires innumerable judgments
for which there is no one obvious answer.” Similarly, health care reform requires innumerable judgments for which
there is no one obvious answer. As
current discussants describe the American health care system as “a mess,” it is
useful to remember how we arrived at
the current messy situation. The answer
lies in the efforts of reform movements
of the past, with all of their intended and
unintended consequences. Our current
system of health care in America can
perhaps be defined as the sum of the intended and unintended consequences of
past legislative, judicial and regulatory
Cont. on page 9
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Philosopher's corner: WHAT DO WE MEAN BY dignity?

I

n contemporary bioethics, few
moral terms are more invoked and
less defined than “human dignity.”
The phrase first appeared in the English
language in 1225, but its meaning is
anything but settled. In the context of
physician-assisted suicide, for example,
human dignity has been used by parties
on both sides of the issue to mean quite
different and sometimes contradictory
things. Opponents of physician-assisted
suicide argue that the practice undermines the dignity (worth) of elderly and
disabled patients, while defenders of
physician-assisted suicide claim that the
practice respects the dignity (autonomy)
of patients. Competing uses of dignity
also appear in discussions about stem
cell research, human enhancement, and
cloning.
The term dignity plays a central role in
a number of recent bioethics documents
as well, including the President’s Council on Bioethics report entitled Human
Cloning and Human Dignity (2002),
the Council of Europe’s Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and
Biomedicine (1997), the World Health
Organization’s Ethical, Scientific and
Social Implications of Cloning in Human
Health (1997), and UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights (1997). None of these
documents, however, set forth a definition of dignity.
In their defense, one might argue that
dignity is a simple concept that does not
require definition. However, the very
fact that people on opposite sides of a
given issue can appropriate the term to
advance their agenda suggests that our
ordinary way of talking about dignity
is confused and vague. If dignity is to
exhibit any moral force in bioethics, it is
important to understand its history and
possible meanings.
The word dignity comes from the
Latin root dingus, meaning worthy. Its
earliest English meaning referred to a
person’s rank. According to this preEnlightenment understanding of the
word, kings, bishops, and noblemen had
dignity; commoners did not. Dignity
6 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

was variable; it could be gained or lost,
depending on a person’s status at any
given time. Though this view of dignity
largely vanished during the Enlightenment, it still persists today when one
talks about honoring dignitaries based
on their elevated status.
A second meaning of dignity can be
traced to Aristotelian notions of virtue.
Dignity of this kind applies to people
who exhibit, through their actions,
excellent character. Unlike dignity
based in rank, this version of dignity has
nothing to do with hierarchy. A slave
stripped of the rights of citizenship
could maintain dignity of this sort if he
comported himself in a virtuous manner.
People who possess this form of dignity
often exhibit qualities like perseverance,
composure, self-respect, decency, and
fairness.
During the Enlightenment, an egalitarian notion of dignity surfaced that
granted dignity to all humans regardless
of rank or virtue. This type of dignity is
concerned with the equality of lives, not
the quality of lives (Meilaender, 2008).
It starts from the premise that all humans have permanent and equal worth,
either because they are made in the image of God (the theological account) or
because of some quality of their humanness (the philosophical account).
A fourth meaning of dignity, which
emphasizes autonomy and free choice,
grew out of the Kantian idea that people
have dignity by virtue of being rational
selves capable of making and applying
universal moral laws. In the West, this
vision of dignity generally is invoked
to protect individual choice and selfdetermination. This use of dignity is so
pervasive in American bioethics that at
least one critic has questioned whether
dignity ever means anything other than
autonomy (Macklin, 2003).
A fifth meaning of dignity, rooted in
communitarianism, suggests that dignity
can operate as something other than
autonomy. This approach to dignity,
which is more traditionally found in Europe than America, focuses on what kind
of society best protects the dignity of

humanity on the whole. It places limits
on individual choices in order to protect
the excellence of humanity and avoid its
degradation.
As these various meanings demonstrate, dignity is a multifaceted concept.
It is far easier to invoke than to define
or defend. The challenge is to articulate
what we mean when we use the term.
Anything less will jeopardize our ability
to appeal to dignity in a normatively
meaningful way.
Leslie A. Meltzer, J.D., M.Sc.
Health Law & Bioethics Fellow
Law & Health Care Program
University of Maryland School of Law
Baltimore, MD
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Case Presentation
One of the regular features of the
Newsletter is the presentation of a
case considered by an ethics committee and an analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are
both encouraged to comment on the
case or analysis and to submit other
cases that their ethics committee
has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and
others in the case should only be
provided with the permission of the
patient. Unless otherwise indicated,
our policy is not to identify the submitter or institution. Cases and comments should be sent to MHECN@
law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, the
Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland School of Law,
500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore,
MD 21201.

CASE STUDY FROM A
MARYLAND HOSPITAL

M

r. P. and his daughter are hoping that his daughter’s kidney
is a match for him. However,
in the screening process, testing revealed
that his daughter is not genetically
related to him. Neither Mr. P. nor his
daughter know this. The transplant team
consults the ethics committee, inquiring
whether they should share this information with Mr. P. or his daughter. If so,
should the wife be approached first?

COMMENTS FROM AN
ETHICS CONSULTANT

I

asked quite a number of my colleagues in healthcare concerning
the question about what to tell the
woman wanting to donate her kidney to
her father who, it turns out, is not her
biological father and that presumably
neither she nor the father knew of this
circumstance.* Almost to a person the
reaction was to tell the daughter she
was not a match and then just leave it at
that. When I asked for a reason for this
almost instinctual response, I generally
heard something about privacy, stirring

up trouble, or perhaps that it was not
relevant to the question of whether the
daughter was an optimal donor. I would
like to tease out a bit some rationale for
making any decision about sharing the
information about paternity. I have three
questions.
First, who is the primary responsible
agent? The answer seems to be the
transplant clinician or whoever is the
designated person who conveys the tissue matching results. Looking beyond
that clinician, we might also say that
the mother is also a moral agent who
may be accountable for actions, but in
the immediate situation, the agent who
has primary responsibility is the one
with special knowledge and very private
information, and who may have the
responsibility to take some action in a
morally responsible way.
The second question is to whom is
the primary moral agent responsible?
Clearly, there is an important responsibility to the daughter who has submitted
to a medical procedure in providing the
blood sample for matching. Looking
beyond the responsibility to the daughter, the clinician also has a responsibility
to the father, who is a potential recipient
of a kidney and who is suffering from
chronic kidney disease. But it does
seem that the primary responsibility is
to the daughter who entrusted her blood
sample to clinicians for matching with
her father. Within the immediate medical
sphere, the mother is not involved.
Finally we have to ask for what is
the clinician responsible? It seems to
many of the people I informally polled
the answer to the "what?"question is
to provide the medical response to the
question, “Can I donate a kidney to my
father? Am I a good match?” The most
straightforward response is that of many
of my colleagues: “On the basis of the
lab test you are unable to donate a kidney to your father because you are not
a good match.” Of course the concern
with this response is what if the daughter asks why she is not a good match?
Also, is there some good medical reason
for the response to be, “On the basis

of the test, it appears that you are not
biologically related to your father”?
There may be a good medical reason to
offer more information, especially if the
daughter needs to know if her father’s
chronic kidney disease is somehow
genetically linked and, that not being the
case, she need not worry about it and all
the ramifications it may have for insurability or even securing a job. If there
is a good medical reason to offer this
important information, there probably is
a good moral reason for sharing it.
We might also ask if there is some
moral reason to share the information
about paternity, whether there is a medical reason or not. Is there a moral reason
to share the information based, perhaps,
on the principle of reciprocity: “I would
want to know, so, therefore, would others.” I am not so sure myself, however,
if I would want to know, and even if I
did, does that mean other presumably
rational persons would want to know
too? If I were a clinician with a long
term relationship with the daughter, I
may have a better understanding of the
daughter’s values and desires and could
answer the question of reciprocity. Of
course in this case the daughter and the
clinician more than likely are strangers
to each other in a nonetheless potentially
highly charged situation.
Probably the best approach, which is
too late in this case, is to be proactive
in obtaining informed consent for the
procedure for obtaining the sample. It
probably is important to tell people that
non-paternity could be discovered by
the test and then give them the option
of whether they would want to know if
that was one of the results. To have this
option in the informed consent process
makes very good sense, especially, as
genetic counselor colleagues tell me,
such results from testing are not uncommon.
Since in this case, the informed consent process did not include this option,
we are still left with a conflict between
the “right to know” and the principle of
non-maleficence. It is easy to imagine,
Cont. on page 8
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Case Presentation
Cont. from page 7

as my colleagues assert, that considerable harm could be caused by disclosure.
Further, the mother, clearly an important
person in this case, is not even a patient.
Only the father and daughter are patients by going through the testing. The
mother, however, could be harmed by
the disclosure. Perhaps one could have a
private conversation with her, letting her
know of the findings and ask her how
to proceed? She is the only one who
presumably would not be surprised by
the news. But that would entail providing private medical information (about
the daughter) such that one would need
her consent to share it.
I would tell the daughter that she was
not a match and that there is no scientific
and genetic link to her father’s kidney
disease. I would do that and then change
the informed consent process, and I
would not sleep well that night. That is
what some folks call the moral remainder.
Brian H. Childs, Ph.D.
Director of Ethics
Shore Health System
University of Maryland Medical System
Easton, MD
*I want to thank the Center for Practical
Bioethics discussion group for a discussion of this case. I particularly want to
thank Terry Rosell, John Lantos, John
Carney and our moderator Rosemary
Flannigan for their insights.

COMMENTS FROM
A GENETIC COUNSELOR

T

he issue of the unintended
discovery of non-paternity, described in the case study presented above, is a common ethical dilemma
faced by genetic counselors. Interestingly, the case above poses the question
of who the information should be shared
with, father or daughter, and with what
involvement of the mother. The wording of this question implies that the
question is to whom the information
should be disclosed, rather than whether
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the information should be disclosed at
all.
This question is particularly interesting
because historically, genetic counselors,
MD clinical geneticists and PhD medical
geneticists believed that non-disclosure
was preferable because it maintained
the woman’s confidentiality and did not
disrupt the family unit (Pencarhina et
al. 1992; Wertz & Fletcher 1988). It is
difficult to determine with any level of
certainty whether this is still the common belief, as most institutions now
have policies which involve discussing
the potential of identifying non-paternity
during the informed consent process for
any test that has the potential to reveal
this information. Despite the ideal approach of preemptive discussion of all
possible scenarios, incidental findings in
clinical care and research are, to some
extent, inevitable. Once faced with that
scenario, what becomes paramount is
how those results are handled. The best
approach remains a matter for debate
with a seemingly endless list of issues
for consideration.
Prior to deciding whether or how to
disclose, one must first consider the
practical nature of the situation—whether
it is possible to provide appropriate care
without disclosing. That is, whether it is
possible to disclose the results of the clinical test without disclosing the paternity
issue. If it is not possible to do this, then
non-paternity must be disclosed in order
to provide standard care. In some cases it
may be possible to present a clinical conclusion without revealing paternity, for
example, a donor may be told “you are
not a match” in a case where a 6/6 match
is needed to proceed with a transplant but
only a 3/6 match is expected for a biological child. In other cases this may not
be possible. For example, if a 3/6 antigen
match on HLA testing is an acceptable
match for a donor and testing is done
only to “confirm” what is presumably
known, then the identification of non-paternity would alter the clinical course and
would need to be revealed.
In the event that it is not possible,
without compromising the clinical care
of the patient, to avoid disclosure of

non-paternity, there remain many issues
to consider: autonomy, nonmaleficence,
deception, non-directiveness versus
paternalism, risk, magnitude, privacy,
truth telling and coercion. Of note,
many of these considerations can be used
both in the argument for and against
disclosure.
When considering autonomy we must
consider the autonomy of the patient
awaiting transplant, the autonomy of the
daughter who is being evaluated as a
donor, and the wife/mother of the patient/
donor. By disclosing the false paternity
we would maximize the daughter’s autonomy as well as the patient’s autonomy.
Disclosing this information would support the daughter’s right to the information as an individual, potentially give her
the opportunity to learn about her genetic
heritage and biological paternal family
history and would allow her to make an
informed decision about organ donation
in light of this new information. Further
disclosure would support the patient’s independent right to know that his daughter
is not biologically his. Conversely, if we
consider the autonomy of the wife/mother, we must respect her independent right
to conceal this information.
The most common argument against
disclosure is often that of nonmaleficence. Healthcare professionals are
taught above all to do no harm and in
situations of non-paternity it is difficult
to determine with any level of certainty
whether disclosure will be more or less
harmful than non-disclosure. It would
be unethical to ignore the possibility that
disclosure could do irrevocable harm to
the family, the extent of which may not
be known, but the potential for psychological, physical, financial or other harms
have all been considered and discussed
throughout the literature.
Deception must be considered from
both an ethical and practical perspective.
First, is it ethical to actively deceive a
patient and provide misinformation or
limited information in order to hide an
incidental finding such as non-paternity, and second, it is practical to do
so? Consider the scenario wherein our
transplant patient moves out of state. His

past medical records are requested by
the medical center and the new treating
physician (attempting to be empathetic)
says, “I see from your chart notes that
your daughter was going to donate a
kidney to you but she was not a match,
it must have been difficult to learn that
she was not your biological daughter
while going through the transplant process.” With people moving from one
area to the other or changing healthcare
providers due to insurance constraints,
medical records are actively shared as
part of patient care on a regular basis.
Once results have been documented in
the medical record, it is very difficult
to ensure that they are always kept
confidential. In addition, release of the
results in this accidental fashion means
that the information is not likely to be
disclosed in a sensitive manner with appropriate support.
In the midst of the considerations
outlined above we must also consider
who is the patient, and to whom is the
obligation to provide care and protect
privacy. At first thought, the individual awaiting transplant is the patient,
however, once the daughter agreed to
testing (in preparation of becoming an
organ donor), she too became a patient
of the transplant team. Since healthcare
providers are morally obligated to protect the privacy of each patient, a new
dilemma becomes apparent—there is no
way to disclose non-paternity to either
party without breaching the confidentiality of the other party.
I have not yet discussed risk, magnitude of risk, or coercion. There is, of
course, a risk in any situation in which
sensitive information is at stake, however, in cases of paternity it is important
to consider previous interactions with
the family to determine the magnitude
of risk. If there was any suggestion of
abuse in the past, this should be seriously considered in the determination
of whether or not to disclose, as one
can imagine abuse escalating in light of
such information. Finally, there is the
risk of coercion. Organ donors are more
likely to be related to the recipient, and
the likelihood of donating an organ

diminishes with the degree of relatedness, therefore, disclosing non-paternity
may influence the daughter’s interest
in donating. Although difficult, the
healthcare team must attempt to make a
decision about disclosure that is independent from the transplant procedure to
avoid withholding the information as a
means of ensuring that the daughter will
proceed with the transplant.
In the end, there is clearly no right or
wrong answer. There are many ethical
and moral considerations that could lead
down either the path of disclosure or
non-disclosure, so we are left with our
best judgment, which may be different
in every case of an incidental finding. In
my opinion, once information has been
identified and documented, it is very
hard to maintain a secret, and certainly
there is no guarantee that the secret will
be kept by others in the future. As a
result, I would argue for disclosure. Assuming that there is a well established
relationship between the transplant team
(including a psychologist) and the father,
I would suggest disclosing to him first
and then working with him to develop a
plan (either with or without him, depending on his preferences) to disclose to the
daughter. I would not involve the wife
in the initial discussion, as she is not the
patient, but I would encourage the transplant patient/father to consider speaking
with his wife and having her involved in
the disclosure to the daughter.
Erynn Gordon, MS, CGC
Senior Genetic Counselor
Coriell Institute for Medical Research
References
Pencarinha, D.F., Bell, N.K., Edwards,
J.G. & Best, R.G. (1992). Ethical issues
in genetic counseling: A comparison of
M.S. counselor and medical geneticist
perspectives. Journal of Genetic Counseling, 1(1), 19-30.

Health Care Reform
Cont. from page 5

efforts, playing out within the medical
market place. All of our past reform
efforts have aimed at achieving an ideal,
but have typically fallen short. However,
although we may never successfully
land on the rocky coast of utopia, that
does not mean we should not try.
Rebecca D. Elon, MD, MPH
Associate Professor of Medicine
Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine
Medical Director, Erickson Health of
Howard County
Columbia, Maryland
This article was adapted with permission from a forthcoming article that will
appear in the Journal of Health Care Law
and Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 1. All rights
reserved.
*I feel enormously fortunate that instead of
dropping out of Medicare, I was given the
opportunity to participate in a new financial
model for providing care to frail elders living in a general community setting through
Erickson Health Medical Group. This project
brings high quality medical care to the Medicare population and does so through a mix of
fee for service and managed care enrollees,
in collaboration with nursing homes and assisted living facilities, whose residents benefit
from the model. I am once again hopeful that
this model will be able to deliver high quality
geriatric medical care in a community setting
in a manner that is sustainable, accountable
and replicable.
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Human Genetics, 42, 592-600.
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Joint Commission Zeroes in on Disruptive Behavior

A

new standard of the Joint
Commission taking effect in
January, 2009 will require
hospital administrators to adopt codes
that define disruptive staff behavior,
and to develop procedures to discipline
disruptive staff, including physicians. In
July, the Commission issued a sentinel
event alert describing the problem and
recommending how hospitals should
handle it. The alert defines disruptive
behaviors as including “overt actions
such as verbal outbursts and physical
threats, as well as passive activities
such as refusing to perform assigned
tasks or quietly exhibiting uncooperative attitudes during routine activities.”
Examples include “reluctance or refusal
to answer questions, return phone calls
or pages; condescending language or
voice intonation; and impatience with
questions.”
The commission recommends that
hospitals educate staff about acceptable
behavior, hold everyone accountable,
and spell out how and when to begin
disciplinary actions. Hospitals also
should protect staff members who report
bad behavior from retribution, and intervene early and in a constructive way
with those accused of bad behavior.
The impetus for this new standard was
informed by a survey about physiciannurse relationships. Rosenstein (2002)
surveyed staff from 142 acute care, nonprofit hospitals in the U.S.. Of the 2,563
respondents, over 90% reported witnessing disruptive physician behavior, the
most frequent types being:
•
•
•
•

Disrespect
Berating colleagues
Use of abusive language
Condescending behaviors

Disruptive outbursts occurred most
frequently in operating rooms, medical-surgical units, intensive care units,
emergency departments, and obstetrics
units. About two thirds of respondents
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stated their hospitals had a code of conduct prohibiting disruptive behavior, but
less than 50% thought their code was
effective. Barriers to reporting disruptive
behaviors were cited as one reason for
this. Such barriers included:

•

Fear of retaliation
Belief that nothing ever changes
Lack of confidentiality
Lack of administrative support
Physician lack of awareness
or unwillingness to change.

•

Both physicians and nurses felt that it
was only a few physicians who exhibited disruptive behavior, and both agreed
that nurses were also guilty of exhibiting
disruptive behaviors toward physicians.
Of concern is that about 37% of respondents believed that nurses were leaving
their workplace as a result of disruptive behavior. This is cause for concern
given the current nursing shortage, and
evidence that higher nurse-patient ratios
and conducive working environments
protect against such errors.
Some physician groups worry that the
application of disruptive behavior policies will be too far-reaching, serving to
silence physicians who speak out in the
process of advocating for their patients.
The American Medical Association
recommends that policies distinguish
between behaviors that represent good
faith efforts to constructively criticize
the workplace versus verbal or physical
conduct that may negatively impact patient care. In addition, hospitals should
verify allegations and discipline hospital
staff fairly. For example, suspending a
physician’s hospital privileges should
only be a mechanism of last resort.
Mechanisms that Rosenstein and
colleagues (2002) identified to promote
healthy interdisciplinary staff relationships include:

•

•
•
•
•
•

•

Providing opportunities for
interdisciplinary communication and collaboration;

•

Offering education and training
to physicians and nurses in
team building, joint collaboration, conflict management, time
management, stress management, and phone etiquette;
Identifying a physician
champion who can promote
nurse-patient collegiality within
the institution;
Getting hospital administration’s support to take disruptive
behavior reports seriously;
Handling reports of disruptive
behavior confidentially, with
prompt and fair follow-up.

REFERENCES
O’Reilly, K.B., (Aug. 18, 2008). New
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Rosenstein, A.H. (2002). Nurse-physician relationships: Impact on nurse
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Rosenstein, A.H., Russell, H. & Lauve,
R. (2002). Disruptive physician behavior contributes to nursing shortage. The
Physician Executive, Nov-Dec, 8-11.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
JANUARY
12

(5:30 pm - 7:30 pm) Ethics Grand Rounds: "Should Palliative Sedation to Unconsciousness be Limited to a
Treatment of Last Resort?" New York Academy of Medicine’s Ethics Grand Rounds. Speaker: Jeffrey Berger,
M.D.. 1216 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY. For more information, visit http://www.nyam.org/events/.

26

(3:00 pm) "Mind Wars: Brain Research and National Defense," Speaker Jonathan Moreno, Ph.D.. Penn State,
Foster Auditorium, 101 Pattee Library, University Park, PA. For more information, visit http://www.psiee.psu.
edu/news/calendar.asp.

FEBRUARY
20-21

Ethics in the Intelligence Community. Sponsored by the International Intelligence Ethics Association, Johns
Hopkins University at Mt. Washington, 5801 Smith Avenue, Baltimore , MD. For more information, visit
http://www.intelligence-ethics.org/.

MARCH
2-5

4th Biennial Becoming an Ethics Consultant Conference. An Intensive 4-Day Training Course for Healthcare
Professionals. Honolulu, Hawaii. Presented by the St. Francis International Center for Healthcare Ethics. For
more information, call 547-6050, e-mail info@stfrancishawaii.org, or visit http://www.stfrancishawaii.org/.

6

2009 Ethics Conference in Raleigh, N.C.. Sponsored by the National Association of Social Workers. Visit
http://www.naswnc.org/ for more information.

9

(5:30 pm - 7:30 pm) “Transforming Health Care: Lessons from the West Coast for the East.” New York
Academy of Medicine’s Ethics Grand Rounds. Speaker: Benjamin Chu, M.D., M.P.H. 1216 Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY. For more information, visit http://www.nyam.org/events/.

31

(7:30 pm) “The Ethics of Aging,” speaker Carol Hausman Ph.D., gerontologist and founding Coordinator of
the Washington Jewish Healing Network. Sponsored by The Hebrew Home of Greater Washington. Jewish
Community Center of Greater Washington, 6125 Montrose Rd., Rockville, MD.

Reconsidering Maryland Law …
How did the Maryland Patient Care Advisory Committee Act and the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act come to be? How
do they influence health care ethics committees (HCECs) in Maryland? What goals were HCECs thought to achieve? Are
they living up to those goals? Are HCEC members who conduct clinical ethics consultations improving the clinical climate
at their institutions? Are they competent to do ethics consultations? What are “best practice” models for HCECs? Are there
alternatives to an institutional HCEC? These and other questions were addressed at the December 3 conference, Health
Care Ethics Committees and Maryland Law – Time for a Change?, sponsored by MHECN in partnership with Harbor Hospital and the Beacon Institute. To view speakers and the conference agenda, visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn.
What did conference speakers and attendees propose as changes, if any, to Maryland legislation impacting HCECs? Stay
tuned to the next issue of the Newsletter for a recap.
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